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Wired Warfare 3.0:  
Protecting the Civilian Population during Cyber Operations 
 
Forthcoming: International Review of the Red Cross 
 
Michael N. Schmitt* 
 
 
Abstract:  As a general matter, international humanitarian law is up to the task of  providing the legal framework for 
cyber operations during an armed conflict. However, two debates  persist in this regard, the resolution of  which will 
determine the precise degree of  protection the civilian population will enjoy during cyber operations. The first revolves 
around the meaning of  the term “attack” in various conduct of  hostilities rules, while the second addresses the issue of  
whether data may be considered an object such that operations destroying or altering it are subject to the prohibition on 
attacking civilian objects and that such effects need be considered when considering proportionality and the taking of  
precautions in attack. Even if  these debates were to be resolved, the civilian population would still face risks from the 
unique capabilities of  cyber operations. This article proposes two policies which parties to a conflict should consider 
adopting in order to ameliorate such risks. They are both based on the premise that military operations must reflect a 
balance between military concerns and the interest of  States in prevailing in the conflict. 
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The refusal by Russia, China, and a number of other countries during the 2016-2017 United Nations 
Group of Governmental Exerts on Developments in the Field of Information and 
Telecommunications in the Context of International Security (UN GGE) negotiations to expressly 
acknowledge the applicability of international humanitarian law (IHL) to cyber operations marked a 
major reversal in the effort to clarify how such operations are constrained by international law.1 Their 
refusal was particularly stunning in light of the fact that two years earlier the previous UN GGE, which 
included both Russia and China as members, had characterized “the principles of humanity, necessity, 
proportionality and distinction” as “established international law principles,” 2 a statement that can 
only  be  interpreted  as  agreement  that  IHL  governs  the  conduct  of  cyber  hostilities  during  armed 
conflicts.  
 
As  a  matter  of  law,  the  refusal  is  puzzling.  There  is  broad  consensus  that  IHL  applies  to  cyber 
operations during an armed conflict. This is the position of key countries wielding cyber capability, 
                                                 
*Member of the Editorial Board; Professor of International Law, University of Exeter; Charles H. Stockton Professor, 
U.S. Naval War College; Francis Lieber Distinguished Scholar, U.S. Military Academy at West Point; General Editor, 
Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Operations. The views expressed are those of the author 
in his personal capacity. The author is grateful to Lieutenant Colonel Jeffrey Biller (USAF) for his invaluable comments. 
1 Michael N. Schmitt and Liis Vihul, International Cyber Law Politicized: The UN GGE’s Failure to Advance Cyber Norms, J UST 
SECURITY (June 30, 2017), https://www.justsecurity.org/42768/international-cyber-law-politicized-gges-failure-advance-
cyber-norms/. 
2 UN Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the 
Context of International Security, 2015 Report, para. 28(d), UN Doc. A/70/174 (July 22, 2015) [hereinafter UN GGE 
2015 Report]. 
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such  as  the  United  States3;  international  organizations  like  NATO  and  the  European  Union;4  the 
ICRC;5 and most of the academic community. 6 The consensus is based in part on State practice that 
has  long  recognized  that  new  means  and  methods  of  warfare  are  subject  to  the  prohibitions, 
restrictions  and  requirements  found  in  IHL’s  weapons  law  and  conduct  of  hostility  rules.7  In  its 
Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, for instance, the International Court of Justice confirmed IHL’s 
applicability to new weapons. 8 Furthermore, Article 36 of Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions requires parties to “in the study, development, acquisition or adoption of a new weapon, 
means or method of warfare….determine whether its employment would, in some or all 
circumstances, be prohibited by this Protocol or by any other rule of international law.” 9 Even non-
Party States to Additional Protocol I  recognize the need to ensure new weapons, including cyber 
weapons, meet the requirements of extant IHL norms. 10 Finally, simple logic dictates that IHL must 
apply to novel ways of conducting hostilities, for almost every conflict brings with it new weapons, 
tactics and operational design. It would be absurd to hold that only means and methods of warfare 
that predated the adoption of a treaty or the crystallization of a customary law rule are subject to the 
principles and rules found therein.11 
 
The question, therefore, is not whether IHL applies to cyber operations conducted during an armed 
conflict. Rather, it is how does it do so? In most cases, application is straightforward. It is hardly a 
jurisprudential  epiphany,  for  example,  to  conclude  that  a  lethal,  injurious  or  destructive  cyber 
operations  directed  at  civilians  not  violates  IHL,12  but  also  constitute  war  crimes  during  both 
                                                 
3 Brian J. Egan, Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of State, Remarks at Berkeley Law School on International Law and 
Stability in Cyberspace (Nov. 10, 2016), https://perma.cc/B6TH-232L.  See also Applicability of  International Law to Conflicts 
in Cyberspace, 2014 DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, ch. 18, sect. A(3)(b), at 737; Harold 
Koh, Legal Adviser, Department of State, Remarks at the U.S. Cyber Command Inter-Agency Legal Conference (Sept. 18, 
2012). On the Koh statement, see Michael N. Schmitt, International Law in Cyberspace: The Koh Speech and Tallinn Manual 
Juxtaposed, 54 HARVARD JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW ON-LINE 13 (2012). 
4 North Atlantic Council, Wales Summit Declaration, para. 72, Sept. 5, 2014, 
https://www.nato.int/cps/ic/natohq/official_texts_112964.htm.  See also European Commission, Cybersecurity Strategy 
of the European Union: An Open, Safe and Secure Cyberspace, Feb. 7, 2013, at 72. 
5 ICRC, Cyberwarfare and International Humanitarian Law: The ICRC’s Position, June 2013, at page 2, 
https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/2013/130621-cyberwarfare-q-and-a-eng.pdf. 
6 See, e.g., TALLINN MANUAL ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER WARFARE (Cambridge U.P., Michael 
N.  Schmitt  gen.  ed.  2013),  rule  20;  TALLINN MANUAL 2.0  ON  THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE  TO CYBER 
OPERATIONS 168 (Cambridge U.P., Michael N. Schmitt gen. ed. 2017), rule 80. 
7 William H. Boothby, W EAPONS AND THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT (Oxford U.P. 2009), at 340-341; ICRC, A Guide 
to the Legal Review of New Weapons, Means and Methods of Warfare (January 2006), at 3-4. 
8 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J Rep. 226, paras. 85-86 (July 8). 
9  Protocol  Additional  to  the  Geneva  Conventions  of  12  August  1949,  and  Relating  to  the  Protection  of  Victims  of 
International Armed Conflicts art. 36, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter AP I]. 
10 Office of the General Counsel, U.S. Department of Defense, Law of War Manual, para. 16.6 (revised edition, Dec. 
2016); U.S. Air Force, Legal Review of Weapons and Cyber Capabilities, AF Instruction 51-402, July 27, 2011. 
11 For an excellent comprehensive survey of the IHL issues arising from cyber operations, see Cordula Droege, Get Off  My 
Cloud: Cyber Warfare, International Humanitarian Law, and the Protection of  Civilians, I NTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED 
CROSS, vol. 94, no. 886 (2012), at 533.  
12 AP I, supra note 9, art. 51(2); I C USTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, rule 1 (Jean-Marie Henckaerts & 
Louise Doswald-Beck eds., 2005); Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and Relating to 
the Protection of Victims of Non-international Armed Conflicts art. 4(i), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609. See also Tallinn 
Manual 2.0, note 6, rule 94. 
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international and non-international armed conflict. 13 Similarly, cyber attacks are self-evidently limited 
by the rule of proportionality14 and the requirement to take precautions in attack.15  
 
A number of issues nevertheless remain unsettled. Lying at the heart of this gray area are two persistent 
debates, the resolution of which will have significant consequences for the civilian population. Both 
are definitional in character. The first deals with the scope of the term “attack”. It is a determinative 
matter with respect to cyber operations because various IHL prohibitions, restrictions and 
requirements apply only to those meeting the definition of attack. 16 A second debate surrounds the 
meaning of the term “object.” It bears on cyber operations by begging the question of whether a cyber 
operation that destroys or alters civilian data in a way that has no physical manifestation is a prohibited 
attack on a civilian object.17 
 
I have addressed these issues in two earlier Review articles, Wired Warfare and Rewired Warfare.18 In this 
piece, I move beyond the law itself in search of partial solutions to these quandaries. This requires a 
brief return visit to the debates. Therefore, in Part I of this article, I summarize the differing views as 
to where the threshold of “attack” lies, whereas in Part II I sketch out the current disagreement as to 
whether data is an object. It is not my intention to relitigate the sundry positions here; on the contrary, 
the discussion in these two Parts is offered solely to illustrate that the law is either unsettled in a way 
that places civilians at risk or fails to address currently lawful cyber operations that could nevertheless 
prove highly detrimental to the civilian population. 
 
Since this situation is unlikely to be resolved as a matter of law any time soon, in Part III, I offer two 
policy proposals to address the shortfalls in civilian protection vis-a-vis cyber operations. They are 
meant to be applied by the State conducting a cyber operation when that State concludes that the 
operation either does not qualify as an attack or is not subject to the prohibition on attacking civilian 
objects because data is being targeted and, in its view, data is not an object. Although the proposals 
are intended to enhance the protection of the civilian population, they remain sensitive to the need of 
                                                 
13 See, e.g., Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court arts. 8(2)(b)(i), 8(2)(c)(i), July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90.  
14 AP I, supra note 9, arts. 51(5)(b), 57(2)(a)(iii), 57(2)(b); Customary IHL Study, supra note 12, rule 14; Tallinn Manual 2.0, 
supra note 6, rule 113. 
15 AP I, supra note 9, art. 57; Customary IHL Study, supra note 12, chapter 5; Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note 6, rules 114-
120. See also Eric Jensen, Cyber Attacks: Proportionality and Precautions in Attack, 89 I NTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES 198 
(2012). 
16 See generally AP I, supra note 9, part IV, sect. I. Some scholars would extend application of the rules beyond attacks 
despite the use of the term in the rules themselves.  See, e.g., Nils Melzer, Cyberwarfare and International Law, UNIDIR 
Resources Paper, 2011, p. 27, http://unidir.org/files/publications/pdfs/cyberwarfare-and-international-law-382.pdf 
(arguing that applicability depends on whether the cyber operations constitute “hostilities”); Heather Harrison Dinniss, 
CYBER WARFARE AND THE LAWS OF WAR, at 196-202 (Cambridge University Press, 2012) (focusing on the reference to 
“military operations” in Article 48 of AP I). 
17 AP I, supra note 9, art. 52(1); Customary IHL Study, supra note 12, rule 7; Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note 6, rule 99. 
18 Michael N. Schmitt, Wired Warfare: Computer Network Attack and Jus in Bello, I NTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED 
CROSS,  Vol.  84,  No.  846,  2002,  p.  365;  Michael  N.  Schmitt,  Rewired  Warfare:  Rethinking  the  Law  of   Cyber  Attack, 
INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS, Vol. 96, No. 893, 2014, p. 189.  See also Knut Dörmann, Applicability of  the 
Additional Protocol to Computer Network Attack, in Karin Bystrom (ed.), P ROCEEDINGS OF THE INTERNATIONAL EXPERT 
CONFERENCE ON COMPUTER NETWORK ATTACKS AND THE APPLICABILITY OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, 
Stockholm, 17–19 November 2004, p. 139, Swedish National Defence College, 2005, 
https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/68lg92.htm. See also Michael N. Schmitt, “Attack” as a Term of  Art 
in International Law: The Cyber Operations Context, P ROCEEDINGS OF THE 4TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON CYBER 
CONFLICT (Christian Czosseck, Rain Ottis & Katharina Ziolkowski eds., NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of 
Excellence, 2012), p. 283. 
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States to conduct their wartime operations effectively. Thus, the proposals are designed to reflect the 
balance  between  humanitarian  considerations  and  military  necessity  that  undergirds  international 
humanitarian law and other norms of warfare.19 
 
It must be cautioned that I am not asserting that the two proposals represent lex lata; in my view they 
do not, although I concede that others may disagree.  Instead, I am proposing a policy-driven, militarily 
realistic,  humanitarian  safety  net  that  States  can  adopt  for  situations  in  which  they  conclude  an 
operation during an armed conflict falls outside the strictures of IHL. Over time, the legal issues that 
are  described  below  may  be  resolved,  thereby  strengthening  the  influence  of  IHL  over  cyber 
operations. But in the interim, the international community needs a practical solution that addresses 
these gray areas in the law of cyber targeting. 
 
I. Issue One:  Meaning of “Attack” 
 
As noted, key IHL prohibitions, restrictions and requirements found in treaty and customary law, or 
both, are framed in terms of “attacks.” For instance, it is prohibited to directly attack civilians or 
civilian objects;20 conduct indiscriminate 21 or perfidious attacks 22; or attack, with various exceptions 
and qualifications, specified persons or objects enjoying special protection (such as medical units, 23 
objects  indispensable  to  the  survival  of  the  civilian  population,24  the  environment,25  works  and 
installations containing dangerous forces,26 non-defended localities,27 and combatants who are hors de 
combat28). Attacks are subject to the rule of proportionality, which prohibits “an attack which may be 
expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a 
combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to concrete and direct military advantage 
anticipated.”29 Additionally, a party to the conflict that is mounting an attack must take certain feasible 
precautions to minimize harm to the civilian population.30  
 
The  interpretation  and  customary  status  of  some  of  these  rules,  especially  with  respect  to  cyber 
operations, are the subject of controversy. The point, however, is that whether they apply in the cyber 
context depends on the scope of the term “attack.”31 Should a cyber operation not qualify as such, the 
                                                 
19 Jean Pictet, DEVELOPMENT AND PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 
1985), at 61-63. On my approach to this balancing, see Michael N. Schmitt, Military Necessity and Humanity in International 
Humanitarian Law: Preserving the Delicate Balance, 50 VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 795 (2010). 
20 AP I, supra note 9, arts. 51(2) and 52(1). On their customary status, see Customary IHL Study, supra note 12, rules 1 and 
7. 
21 AP I, supra note 9, art .51(4); Customary IHL Study, supra note 12, rule 11. 
22 AP I, supra note 9, art. 37(1); Customary IHL Study, supra note 12, rule 65. On the use of the term with respect to misuse 
of enemy emblems of nationality, see AP I, supra note 9, art. 39(2); Customary IHL Study, supra note 12, rule 62. 
23 AP I, supra note 9, art. 12(1); Customary IHL Study, supra note 12, rule 28. On the use of the term with respect to 
attacking medical aircraft, see AP I, supra note 9, arts. 27(2), 31(2). 
24 AP I, supra note 9, art. 54(2); Customary IHL Study, supra note 12, rule 54. 
25 AP I, supra note 9, art. 55(2).  The customary status of this rule is unsettled. 
26 AP I, supra note 9, art. 56(1). The customary status of this rule is unsettled. 
27 AP I, supra note 9, art. 59(1); Customary IHL Study, supra note 12, rule 37. 
28 AP I, supra note 9, art. 41(1); Customary IHL Study, supra note 12, rule 47. On the prohibition on attacking persons 
parachuting from aircraft in distress, see AP I, supra note 9, art. 42. 
29 AP I, supra note 9, arts. 51(5)(b), 57(2)(a)(iii), 57(2)(b); Customary IHL Study, supra note 12, rules 14, 19. 
30 AP I, supra note 9, art. 57; Customary IHL Study, supra note 12, rule 15. 
31 For an excellent summary regarding the issue of cyber attacks, see William H.  Boothby, T HE LAW OF TARGETING 
(Oxford U.P., 2012).  
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rules are inapplicable, although other rules of IHL may nevertheless prohibit or restrict the  cyber 
operation.32  
 
Article  49(1)  of  Additional  Protocol  I  defines  attacks  as  “acts  of  violence  against  the  adversary, 
whether offense or in defense.” It is well accepted that conducting an act of violence against civilians 
or civilian objects also qualifies as an attack. 33 Drawing on this definition, the experts who produced 
the Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Operations concluded that a cyber attack 
includes any “cyber operation, whether offensive or defensive, that is reasonably expected to cause 
injury or death to persons or damage or destruction to objects.” 34 This is so irrespective of whether 
the harm is caused to the target of the attack or collaterally.35 There would appear to be no meaningful 
objection to characterizing cyber operations having these results as attacks. 
 
What is often missed is that the experts did not limit the concept of “cyber attack” to physically 
destructive  or  injurious  cyber  operations.  A  majority  of  them  concurred  that  “interference  with 
functionality  qualifies  as  damage  if  restoration  of  functionality  requires  replacement  of  physical 
components.”36 Thus, a cyber operation resulting in cyber infrastructure’s loss of functionality would 
amount to a cyber attack. 
 
At that point, consensus among the experts broke down, for they took various positions with respect 
to the meaning of “loss of functionality.” Whereas some would limit loss of functionality to situations 
in which physical components of targeted cyber infrastructure need to be repaired or replaced, others 
were willing to extend the notion to those in which regaining functionality requires reinstallation of 
the operating system or of bespoke data upon which the system relies to perform its intended function. 
A number of them went so far as to argue that it is immaterial how the loss of functionality occurs. 
The mere fact that the system no longer works as designed is sufficient.37 
 
A further grey area of the law involves cyber operations that do not result in injury or damage, but 
nevertheless cause adverse consequences for the civilian population, such as  “disrupting all email 
communications throughout the country.” 38 Most of the Tallinn Manual experts, despite recognizing 
the extent to which cyber operations of this nature might disrupt civilian life, were of the view that 
there is as yet no legal basis for treating such operations as an attack.39 Nevertheless, all of the experts 
agreed that cyber operations causing mere inconvenience or irritation do not rise to the level of a cyber 
attack.40  
 
                                                 
32 See, e.g., DoD Manual, supra note 10, para 16.5.2. 
33 Nils Melzer, Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities under International Humanitarian 
Law (ICRC 2009), at 49. 
34 Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note 6, rule 92. 
35 Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note 6, at 419. 
36 Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note 6, at 417. See also Droege, supra note 11, at 560-561. 
37 Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note 6, at 417-418.  On the loss of functionality, see Boothby, Law of Targeting, supra note __, 
at 386-387. 
38 Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note 6, at 418. 
39 Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note 6, at 418. 
40 Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note 6, at 418. See also ICRC, International Humanitarian Law and the Challenges of  Contemporary 
Armed Conflicts, Oct. 2015, at 41-42, https://www.icrc.org/en/document/international-humanitarian-law-and-challenges-
contemporary-armed-conflicts. 
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The ICRC addressed the issue in both its 2011 and 2015 IHL Challenges reports. 41 In the latter, the 
organization noted that “the manner in which the notion of cyber ‘attack’ is defined under the rules 
governing the conduct of hostilities…will greatly influence the protection that IHL affords to essential 
civilian infrastructure.”42 It went on to zero in on the decisive question of the point at which loss of 
functionality renders a cyber operation an attack. In particular, the ICRC concluded that “an operation 
designed to disable an object – for example a computer or a computer network – constitutes an attack 
under the rules on the conduct of hostilities, whether or not the object is disabled through kinetic or 
cyber means.”43 The report correctly observed that “an overly restrictive understanding of the notion 
of attack would be difficult to reconcile with the object and purpose of the rules on the conduct of 
hostilities, which is to ensure the protection of the civilian population and civilian objects against the 
effects of hostilities.”44  
 
Sagaciously,  the  ICRC  used  the  report  to  highlight  the  ambiguity  in  the  concepts  surrounding 
qualification as an attack. For example, with respect to the exclusion of cyber operations that merely 
cause inconvenience, the ICRC pointed out that “what is covered by ‘inconvenience’ is not defined 
and this terminology is not used in IHL.”45 But like the Tallinn Manual 2.0 experts, the ICRC recognizes 
that,  to  an  extent,  the  nature  of  consequences,  and  not  necessarily  their  severity,  matters  when 
qualifying a cyber operation as an attack. In particular, the report excluded espionage per se as an attack 
and noted that “the jamming of radio communications or television broadcast has not traditionally 
been considered an attack in the sense of IHL.”46 
 
By  these  mainstream approaches,  it  is  possible  to definitively  characterize  destructive  or  injurious 
cyber operations as attacks and exclude those at the low-end of the effects spectrum. Yet, most cyber 
operations are unlikely to be physically destructive or injurious and many will not affect the targeted 
cyber infrastructure’s functionality in a manner that would be clearly cross whatever the appropriate 
threshold might be for loss of functionality.  
 
This is troubling on two accounts. First,  many cyber operations that might be directed at civilian 
infrastructure  or  otherwise  have  serious  adverse  consequences  for  the  civilian  population  would 
arguably not qualify as cyber attacks, and accordingly lie beyond the reach of IHL’s rules on attack. 
Second, uncertainty with respect to the loss of functionality threshold leaves the legal characterization 
of certain cyber operations directed at or affecting the civilian population ambiguous. A party to the 
conflict  could  exploit  such  uncertainty  to  avoid  consensus  condemnation  as  unlawful  of  cyber 
operations that are directed at or otherwise affect civilian cyber infrastructure. From a humanitarian 
perspective, this situation is untenable. 
 
 
II. Issue Two: Data as Objects 
 
                                                 
41 ICRC, International Humanitarian Law and the Challenges of  Contemporary Armed Conflicts, Oct. 2011, at 38, 
https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/red-cross-crescent-movement/31st-international-conference/31-int-conference-
ihl-challenges-report-11-5-1-2-en.pdf; 2015 IHL Challenges Report, supra note 40, at 41-42 
42 2015 IHL Challenges Report, supra note 40, at 41. 
43 2015 IHL Challenges Report, supra note 40, at 41. 
44 2015 IHL Challenges Report, supra note 40, at 41. 
45 2015 IHL Challenges Report, supra note 40, at 42. 
46 2015 IHL Challenges Report, supra note 40, at 41-42. 
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A second dilemma posing particular risk for the civilian population surrounds the question of whether 
the notion of “objects” extends to data, such that civilian data would enjoy the protection of the 
prohibition on attacking civilian objects. 47 This question is independent of the issue of the definition 
of attack, for if data is an object, the deletion or alteration of the targeted data would plainly comprise 
the damage that is necessary to qualify the cyber operation as an attack.  And if data is not an object, 
the prohibition does not attach.48 
 
Two views dominate the discourse. A majority of the Tallinn Manual experts agreed that the term 
“object” should not be interpreted as encompassing data. 49 They based their conclusion on the fact 
that data neither falls within the “ordinary meaning” 50 of the term “object” because it is intangible, 
nor “comports with the explanation of it offered in the ICRC Additional Protocols 1987 
commentary.”51   
 
The other experts replied that adopting this approach “would mean that even the deletion of essential 
civilian datasets such as Social Security data, tax records, and bank accounts would potentially escape 
the regulatory reach of the law of armed conflict, thereby running counter to the principle that the 
civilian population enjoys general protection from the effects of hostilities.” They looked to the object 
and purpose of the prohibition on attacking civilian objects to conclude that the essential factor is the 
“severity of the operation’s consequences, not the nature of harm.” For these experts, “civilian data 
that is ‘essential’ to the well-being of the civilian population is encompassed in the notion of civilian 
objects and protected as such.”52  
 
In  its  2015  IHL Challenges  report,  the  ICRC  made  a  similar  observation.  Noting  that  “deleting  or 
tampering with [certain] data could quickly bring government services and private businesses to a 
complete standstill, and could cause more harm to civilians than the destruction of physical objects,”53 
the organization opined that “[t]he conclusion that this type of operation would not be prohibited by 
IHL in today’s ever more cyber-reliant world – either because deleting or tampering with such data 
would not constitute an attack in the sense of IHL or because such data would not be seen as an 
                                                 
47 It must be cautioned that the debate does not extend to a cyber operation directed at data when that operation has 
knock-on destructive or injurious effects. Consider a cyber operation that deletes or manipulates data in an air traffic 
control system and thereby risks the crash of aircraft.  There is broad consensus that such an operation would be an attack. 
The data issue only arises in situations in which a cyber operation against data does not risk having consequences that 
otherwise would qualify it as an attack.  
48 Operations directed against certain data are prohibited by other IHL rules. See, e.g., Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note 6, 
rule 132 and discussion at 515 (medical data) and rule 142 and discussion at 535-536 (some experts extend protection to 
cultural property in data form).  
49 Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note 6, at 437. 
50 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (entered into force 27 January 1980), art. 
31(1). 
51 Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski and Bruno Zimmerman (eds), C OMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, 
ICRC, Geneva, 1987, paras. 2007- 2008: ‘The English text uses the word “objects”, which means “something placed before 
the eyes, or presented to the sight or other sense, an individual thing seen, or perceived, or that may be seen or perceived; 
a material thing”. … The French … text uses the word “biens”, which means “chose tangible, susceptible d’appropriation.” 
It is clear that in both English and French the word means something that is visible and tangible.’. It must be acknowledged 
that the context in which the explanation was offered is not directly on point; however, the Tallinn Manual 2.0 experts 
nevertheless found it helpful in their deliberations. 
52 Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note 6, at 437. 
53 2015 IHL Challenges report, supra note 40, at 43. 
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object that would bring into operation the prohibition of attacks on civilian objects – seems difficult 
to reconcile with the object and purpose of this body of norms.”54 I agree in principle. 
 
Various other approaches have been suggested to deal with the matter. One differentiates between 
so-called operational and content level data. 55 The former denotes data upon which the functioning 
of cyber infrastructure is reliant, whereas the latter simply represents information in data form, such 
as the data upon which this article is based. Dealing only with operational level data, the approach 
rejects the criterion of tangibility and instead concentrates its attention on whether the data qualifies 
as a military objective.56 In doing so, it implicitly adopts an absolutist view of operational level data as 
an object. A somewhat broader approach is to simply treat data as an object. In one example thereof, 
the proponent supports doing so by “means of a textual, systematic and teleological interpretation of 
the definition of military objectives found in treaty and customary law.” 57 He concludes that “if the 
law  of  armed  conflict  is  to  retain  its  relevance,  it  ought  to  reflect  this  change.  That  is  why,  it  is 
submitted, in 2015 computer data are objects under international humanitarian law.”58 
 
None of the aforementioned approaches is entirely satisfactory. The restrictive approach adopted by 
the majority of the Tallinn Manual experts is under inclusive in a practical sense, for it leaves data open 
to destruction or alteration that could have extremely serious, even if not destructive or injurious, 
consequences for the civilian population. This would, as its critics allege, run counter to the IHL’s 
object and purpose.  
 
By contrast, the argument, however arrived at, that data per se qualifies as an object is over inclusive. 
Militaries have long conducted information operations against the enemy population, for instance to 
undercut support for the government or its policies. 59 Doing so is especially alluring during counter-
insurgencies.60 With the advent of cyber capabilities, such operations have been carried out by cyber 
means.61 Cyber psychological operations, as an example, can include the destruction or alteration of 
data, as with disrupting civilian media activities.  
 
The severity approach advocated by the minority during the Tallinn Manual process, as well as by the 
ICRC, is the most viscerally appealing. Unfortunately, no legal justification beyond the rather general 
claim of compliance with object and purpose has been offered to support it. Nor has useful, granular 
guidance explicating its implementation been set out. Moreover, it glosses over the fact that the issue 
at hand is a definitional one. This begs the question of the normative logic of characterizing certain 
data as an object based on severity of the consequences, but not doing so vis-à-vis other data when 
                                                 
54 Id. 
55 Heather A. Harrison Dinniss, The Nature of  Objects: Targeting Networks and the Challenge of  Defining Cyber Military Objectives, 
48 ISRAEL LAW REVIEW 39 (2015). 
56 Id. at 41-49.  
57 Kubo Macak, Military Objectives 2.0: The Case for Interpreting Computer Data as Objects under International Humanitarian Law, 48 
ISRAEL LAW REVIEW 55 at 55 (2015).  I responded to both approaches in The Notion of  ‘Objects” during Cyber Operations: A 
Riposte in Defence of  Interpretive Precision, 48 ISRAEL LAW REVIEW 81 (2015). 
58 Macak, supra note 57, at 80. 
59 See generally, e.g., U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, INFORMATION OPERATIONS, Joint Publication 3-13, as amended Nov. 20, 
2014.  
60 See, e.g., U.S. Army, COUNTERINSURGENCY, Field Manual 3-24, Dec. 2006, paras. 5-19 to 5-34. 
61 The U.S. military is carefully assessing the use of such capabilities.  See, e.g., Liston Wells II, Cognitive-Emotional Conflict: 
Adversary Will and Social Resilience, 7:2 P RISM 5 (2017).  Prism is published by the US National Defense University. The 
emphasis on such operations is evidenced by establishment of the College of Information and Cyberspace at National 
Defense University (see http://cic.ndu.edu/).  
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the  consequences  of  damaging  or  altering  it  are  less  serious.  It  might  make  sense  to  draw  a 
transactional legal line on the basis of consequences caused, as is done with the rule of proportionality, 
but the same reasoning does not apply when merely defining a term. 
 
The debate will not be resolved in the near future, for adopting an approach by which data either is 
or is not an object leads to results that are unsatisfactory and impractical. And although considering 
the severity of consequences for the civilian population seems to reflect the foundational purposes of 
IHL, the lack of a clear legal basis for the position renders it lex ferenda, rather than lex lata. 
 
 
III. What is to be done? 
 
What is to be done in the face of this troubling situation?  In my view, the answer lies in looking to 
the spirit, since the letter falls short, of IHL to inform policy choice. I therefore offer two policy 
recommendations in that spirit, both of which focus on the severity of effects caused for the civilian 
population, rather than the type (as in physical damage) of the harm resulting. 
 
The spirit of international humanitarian law is found in its delicate balancing act between the interests 
of States in effectively conducting military operations and the suffering it causes to both combatants 
and the civilian population. This balancing has been repeatedly recognized in the key IHL treaties and 
State guidance. For instance, the 1863 Lieber Code, which set forth instructions for the Union Army 
during the U.S. Civil War, provided,  
 
Military necessity does not admit of cruelty – that is, the infliction of suffering for the sake of 
suffering or for revenge, nor of maiming or wounding except in fight, nor of torture to extort 
confessions. It does not admit of the use of poison in any way, nor of the wanton devastation 
of a district. It admits of deception, but disclaims acts of perfidy; and, in general, military 
necessity does not include any act of hostility which makes the return to peace unnecessarily 
difficult.62  
 
Five years later, the St. Petersburg Declaration similarly emphasized the need to “fix[] the technical 
limits at which the necessities of war ought to yield to the requirements of humanity.”63 Balancing also 
animated the 1907 Hague Peace Conference, as is apparent in Hague Convention IV, which noted 
that  the  instrument,  one  that  since  has  been  recognized  as  having  a  customary  character,64  was 
“inspired by the desire to diminish the evils of war, as far as military requirements permit.” 65 The 
                                                 
62 U.S. Department of War, Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field, General Orders 
No. 100, Apr. 24, 1863 (Lieber Code), art. 16. 
63 Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles Under 400 Grammes Weight, preamble, 
Nov. 29, 1868, 18 Martens Nouveau Recueil (ser. 1) 474 
64 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 
136 at 172 (July 9); Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226 at 257 (July 8). 
The Nuremberg Tribunal also found the rules set forth in Hague IV to reflect customary law. 1 Trial of the Major War 
Criminals before the International Military Tribunal 254 (1947). 
65 Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land (Hague Convention IV), preamble, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 
Stat. 2277, 207 Consol. T.S. 277.  See also Convention with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land, preamble, 
July 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1803, 26 Martens Nouveau Recueil (ser. 2) 949. The 1899 and 1907 Hague Regulations, in Article 
22 of the annex to both treaties, also noted, “[t]he right  of belligerents to adopt  means of injuring the enemy is not 
unlimited.” For the modern expression of this principle, see AP I, supra note 9, art. 35(1) (adding a reference to “methods” 
of warfare). 
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instrument likewise set out the “Martens Clause”, which reappeared seven decades later in Additional 
Protocol I:  
 
Until a more complete code of the laws of war has been issued, the High Contracting Parties 
deem it expedient to declare that, in cases not included in the Regulations adopted by them, 
the inhabitants and the belligerents remain under the protection and the rule of the principles 
of the law of nations, as they result from the usages established among civilized peoples, from 
the laws of humanity, and the dictates of the public conscience.66 
 
These examples exemplify the International Court of Justice’s observation in Corfu Channel, its first 
case, that “elementary considerations of humanity” infuse international law. 67   
 
Cyber operations are a game changer in terms of achieving the sought-after balance informing IHL. 
International humanitarian law was crafted in the context of means and methods of warfare, the effects 
of which were to damage, destroy, injure or kill. While the civilian population might suffer as a result 
of military operations that do not cause these consequences, the threat of harm was overwhelmingly 
from such effects. Thus, IHL rules are grounded in shielding civilians and civilian objects from them, 
at least to the extent possible without depriving States of their ability to conduct essential military 
operations.68 
 
Unlike kinetic means and methods of warfare, however, cyber operations can severely disrupt civilian 
life without necessarily running afoul of such physicality-based rules. This is because the vast majority 
of the operations, being neither damaging nor injurious, do not fit neatly into the extant normative 
architecture meant to protect the civilian population. This predicament cannot be alleviated by treating 
civilian data as a protected civilian object, for doing so would be legally controversial at best and almost 
certainly prove unacceptable to many States.   
 
The first step in remedying the situation is to recognize that, as illustrated, the international community 
generally accepts the principle that the suffering afflicted on the civilian population by warfare should 
be  minimized  to  the  extent  possible  in  the  attendant  circumstances.  There  is  no  reason  to  limit 
application of this humanitarian principle to the province hard law. On the contrary, most IHL norms 
were  either  adopted  in  treaty  form  or  crystallized  into  customary  law  only  after  the  international 
community found the actions to which they apply unacceptable or inappropriate in the circumstances. 
Humanitarian policies and perspectives have often matured into law over time. 
 
                                                 
66 1907 Hague Convention IV, supra note 65, preamble; AP I, supra note 9, art. 1(2).  The clause has been cited by the 
International Court of Justice. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 64, at 257.   
67 Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4 at 22 (Apr. 9).  
68 This cognitive paradigm of physicality finds expression, for example, in the general principle that the “civilian population 
and individual civilians shall enjoy general protection against dangers arising from military operations” (AP I, supra note 9, 
art. 51(1)); the reference to  violence in  the definition of attack (art. 49(1)); the limitation in the application of the rule 
proportionality and certain precautions in attack to “incidental  loss of  civilian life, injury to civilians, [and] damage to civilian 
objects” (arts. 51(5)(b), 57(2)(a)(ii), 51(2)(a)(iii), 51(2)(b)); and the prohibition of “acts or threats of  violence the primary 
purpose of which is to spread terror among the civilian population” (art. 51(2)). Indeed, in explicating the principle of 
distinction, which requires that parties to a conflict “at all time distinguish between the civilian population combatants and 
between civilian objects and military objectives and accordingly…direct their operations only against military objectives” 
(art. 48), the ICRC Commentary to the Additional Protocols defines military operations as those “during which violence is 
used” (Additional Protocols Commentary, supra note 51, para. 1875). 
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Therefore,  I  propose  that  States  adopt  two  humanitarian  policy  norms  to  address  the  gaps  and 
uncertainty identified above. Some States may be of the view that elements thereof already reflect 
IHL. However, because consensus is lacking, it is necessary to style them as policy mandates, at least 
for States that do not hold that position. 
 
a. Policy One: Essential Civilian Functions 
 
The first proposal is to accord special protection to certain “essential civilian functions or services” by committing to 
refrain from conducting cyber operations against civilian infrastructure or data that interfere with  them. I raised the 
notion  in  a  2014  article,69  where  I  suggested  that  over  time  States  might  “simply  begin  to  treat 
operations against essential civilian services and data as attacks by refraining from conducting them 
and  condemning  those  who  do,  thereby  creating  the  State  practice  upon  which  an  evolution  in 
meaning can be based.”70 That proposal was misguided in the sense that I confused adaptation of the 
meaning of a term – “attack” – with what is effectively a special protection.  Therefore, I am now 
recasting the idea in the guise of a special protection based in policy to be adopted by States that do 
not already see it as a legal requirement.71 
 
Note that the proposal is to safeguard functions and services rather than specified categories of civilian 
(that is, not qualifying as a military objective)  cyber infrastructure or data. This is meant to avoid 
disagreement  over  whether  specific  infrastructure  or  data  falls  within  the  protected  category.  By 
focusing  on  functions  or  services,  protection  is  extended  to  any  infrastructure  or  data  that  might 
degrade  them  irrespective  of  the  nature  or  category  of  infrastructure  or  data  involved.  Such  an 
approach  is  not  unprecedented  in  IHL.  For  instance,  interference  by  cyber  means  with  medical 
functions72 or, under certain circumstances, the provision of humanitarian assistance 73 is prohibited. 
The proposal takes the same tack, albeit from a policy perspective. 
 
                                                 
69 Michael N. Schmitt, The Law of  Cyber Warfare: Quo Vadis?, 25 STANFORD LAW AND POLICY REVIEW 269 (2014). 
70 Schmitt, Quo Vadis, supra note 69, at 296. 
71 For an early proposal along these lines, see Adam Segal, ‘Cyber space governance: the next step’, Council 
on Foreign Relations, Policy Innovation Memorandum No. 2, 14 November 2011, p. 3,  
www.cfr.org/cybersecurity/cyberspace-governance-next-step/p24397. A number of authors have expressed skepticism 
about its prospects. Droege, supra note 11, at 577; Robin Geiss and Henning Lahmann, ‘Cyber Warfare: Applying the 
Principle of Distinction in an Interconnected Space’, in Israeli Law Review, Vol. 45, No. 3, November 2012, p. 394. I am 
less pessimistic than them about the prospect of States issuing such declarations or policies regarding so-called “digital 
safe havens,” but believe the proposal, which encompassed both jus ad bellum and jus in bello issues, requires greater legal 
granularity.  
72 Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note 6, rule 131 (duty to “respect” is “breached by actions that impede or prevent medical or 
religious personnel, units, or medical transports from performing their medical or religious functions.” Id. at 514). For the 
obligations generally, see Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in the Armed 
Forces  in  the  Field  arts.  19,  24,  25,  35-36,  Aug.  12,  1949,  6  U.S.T.  3114,  75  U.N.T.S.  31;  Convention  (II)  for  the 
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea arts. 22, 24, 25, 
27, 36-39, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War 
art. 33, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in 
Time of War arts. 18-22, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287; AP I, supra note 9, arts. 12, 15, 21-24, 26; Protocol 
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of II, supra note 12, 
art. 9. 
73 Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note 6, rule 145 For the obligation generally, see GC IV, supra note 72, arts. 23 and 59; AP I, 
supra note 9, arts. 69-70. 
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In its 2015 IHL Challenges report, the ICRC similarly highlighted the need for protection of essential 
civilian infrastructure and civilian data, particularly in light of uncertainty in the law.74 It observed, 
 
With regard to data belonging to certain categories of objects that enjoy specific protection 
under IHL, the protective rules are comprehensive. For example, the obligation to respect and 
protect medical facilities must be understood as extending to medical data belonging to those 
facilities. However, it would be important to clarify the extent to which civilian data that does 
not  benefit  from  such  specific  protection,  such  as  social  security  data,  tax  records,  bank 
accounts, companies’ client files or election lists or records, is already protected by the existing 
general rules on the conduct of hostilities. 
 
While I agree with the ICRC, clarification could result in a finding that IHL does not fully protect key 
data affecting the civilian population. The proposed policy would lower that risk, for if clarification 
found data not to be protected by IHL, it would nevertheless enjoy protection based on the policy.  
Additionally, the policy could operate until the matter of data, as well as the threshold of attack, is 
settled. 
  
The devil is in the details, specifically, identifying the functions and services that qualify as essential. 
There is certain to be disagreement in this regard, as already evidenced by the long-running debates 
over designating systems as “critical infrastructure.” 75 As an example of possible disagreement, note 
how the ICRC highlighted data affiliated with bank accounts and election records in the extract above. 
I suspect that many States would be unwilling to completely take such data off the table. For instance, 
a  cyber  operation  blocking  access  to  the  bank  accounts  of  an  enemy  dictator’s  cronies  or  senior 
members of her political party might well be an attractive option during an armed conflict. Similarly, 
disrupting her reelection by manipulating election returns might appeal to the enemy State. This point 
is made not to express disagreement, but rather to underline that it will be difficult to forge broad 
consensus as to which civilian functions and services are essential and merit protection. 
 
Nevertheless,  certain  functions  would  seem  to  clearly  fall  within  the  category’s  boundaries.  For 
instance, the delivery of social services to the disabled, young, poor and elderly would do so. So too 
would primary and secondary education. Indicators of the propriety of  inclusion of a function or 
service in the category could include the fact that interference therewith would likely cause significant 
mental anguish amongst the civilian population. To illustrate, I have suggested elsewhere that “the 
integrity of data of financial institutions and the availability of critical financial systems” should be 
afforded special protection as a matter of policy.76  
 
Another indicator might be that a cyber operation affecting a particular function of service would have 
consequences extending well beyond the close of hostilities. A prime example would be impeding the 
overall functioning of a country’s university system, although this protection would not extend to 
individual cyber infrastructure at a university qualifying as a military objective, as in the case of that 
used to conduct weapons or other military-related research. 
                                                 
74 2015 Challenges Report, supra note 40, at 42-43. 
75 See, e.g., John Moteff, Claudia Copeland, and John Fischer,  Critical Infrastructures: What Makes an Infrastructure 
Critical? (Congressional Research Service Report, Jan. 29, 2003). 
76 Michael N. Schmitt and Tim Maurer, Protecting Financial Data in Cyberspace: Precedent for Further Progress on Cyber Norms? 
JUST SECURITY (August 26, 2017), https://www.justsecurity.org/44411/protecting-financial-data-cyberspace-precedent-
progress-cyber-norms/. That proposal does not encompass such activities as blocking access to data for a limited period 
of time or intruding into confidential data. 
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b. Policy Two: Balancing Negative Civilian Effects and Benefits Related to the Conflict 
 
The second proposed policy would apply in situations not encompassed in the first (or until agreement 
is reached regarding designated functions and services). Unlike the first, which is absolute in character, 
this commitment is a relative in that it is based on a balancing of humanitarian considerations and a 
State’s interest in prevailing in the armed conflict. By it, States would commit, as a matter of policy, to 
refrain from conducting cyber operations to which the IHL rules governing attacks do not apply when the expected concrete 
negative effects on individual civilians or the civilian population is excessive relative to the concrete benefit related to the 
conflict that is anticipated to be gained through the operation.77  
 
Drawing  on  the  controversies  set  forth  above,  IHL  inapplicability  could  result  from  a  State’s 
conclusion that the operation is not an attack under IHL or by its taking of a position that data is not 
an object. Importantly, the perspective on the applicable interpretation of the law would be that of 
the State conducting the operation. In other words, by this proposal a State would agree to apply the 
policy whenever it concludes that an operation is not subject to the IHL rules on the conduct of 
hostilities. Another State might come to a different conclusion with respect to an analogous operation; 
in that case, it would follow guidance found in that law. 
 
The commitment merits careful parsing. To begin with, it encompasses operations targeting cyber 
infrastructure and data that are either military objectives or civilian objects. An interesting point in this 
regard highlighted by the 2015 IHL Challenges report involves so-called “dual-use” objects, that is, 
those used for both military and civilian purposes. The prevailing position among IHL experts is that 
any  military  use  of  a  civilian  object,  including  cyber  infrastructure,  renders  the  object  a  military 
objective, with the exception of those aspects thereof that are clearly separate and distinct 
components.78 The report expresses apprehension about this standard should it be applied in the cyber 
context.   
 
A  strict  application  of  this  understanding  could  lead  to  the  conclusion  that  many  objects 
forming part of the cyberspace infrastructure would constitute military objectives and would 
not be protected against attack, whether cyber or kinetic. This would be a matter of serious 
concern because of the ensuing impact that such a loss of protection could have in terms of 
disruption of the ever-increasing concomitant civilian usage of cyber space.79  
                                                 
77 IHL’s focus on physicality poses particular challenges with respect to cyber operations that do amount to an attack. In 
particular, the collateral damage that factors into the proportionality analysis and the requirement to take feasible 
precautions in attack is textually limited to injury, death, or damage. Although damage can reasonably be understood to 
include loss of functionality (wherever that threshold might lie), it does not include other forms of harm. For example, a 
proportionality analysis of an attack on dual-use cyber infrastructure would not need, as a matter of law, to account for 
the temporary disruption or loss of civilian services that depend on it unless that loss placed civilians at risk of physical 
harm or civilian objects at risk of damage. While this is also the case with the kinetic strikes, as with an attack on a store 
that is being used to stash weapons, networking and other forms of connectivity exacerbate the knock-on non-
destructive or non-injurious effects of cyber attacks. This article does not address that reality as it is limited to cyber 
operations falling beyond the reach of IHL, but it is a cyber-specific phenomenon that merits serious attention. 
78 Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note 6, rule 101; Harvard Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research, Manual on 
International Law Applicable to Air and Missile Warfare 119 (2013); Nils Melzer, INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW: 
A COMPREHENSIVE INTRODUCTION 92 (ICRC, 2016). For a discussion of the distinctness of part of a targeted object, see 
Michael N. Schmitt and John J. Merriam, The Tyranny of  Context: Israeli Targeting Practices in Legal Perspective, 37 U NIVERSITY 
OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 53 (2015), at 119-123. 
79 2015 Challenges report, supra note 40, at 42. 
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I share the concern. Whether such cyber infrastructure should be considered a military objective is an 
issue that is beyond the scope of this article; I take the prevailing view. But even if this stance was to 
shift  over  time  and  certain  dual-use  cyber  infrastructure  began  to  be  characterized  as  civilian  in 
character, it would nevertheless be lawful to conduct cyber operations against it, including operations 
having severe consequences for the civilian population, so long as those operations did not rise to the 
level of an attack, in particular by being destructive or injurious.  The proposed policy would in part 
ameliorate this dilemma. 
 
Certain terms contained in the policy were cautiously selected to make particular points and hopefully 
will serve as the fulcrum around which subsequent discussions occur. “Negative effects” is meant to 
be all-encompassing. It includes any effect on the civilian population that does not qualify the cyber 
operation as an attack and therefore subject it to application of the rules on attack. Although limited 
to effects on persons as distinct from objects, it extends to those consequences for civilians that result 
from an operation’s effect on the targeted infrastructure. To take a simple example, a denial of service 
attack on a bank’s computer system would deprive customers of their ability to withdraw currency; 
the customers have been affected and the policy applies.   
 
The focus on effects also signals that the type of a cyber operation has no bearing on applicability of 
the proposal. For instance, a denial of service attack or an operation that causes a cyber system to slow 
would  be  no  less  governed  by  the  policy  than  one  resulting  in  the  system  operating  improperly. 
Instead, the key factor is that the civilian population is somehow affected in a manner that is not 
addressed, at least in the opinion of the State conducting the operation, by the rules of IHL. 
 
Although the Tallinn Manual experts agreed that inconvenience is not sufficiently severe to reach the 
attack threshold, there is no reason to draw a line of that nature in the case of the proposed policy. 
This is because it would only prohibit a cyber operation when the negative civilian effects thereof are 
excessive relative to the conflict-related benefits that are anticipated to result. As a matter of policy, 
there is rationale for excluding inconvenience or irritation as a prohibitive consequence if the party 
conducting the cyber operation cannot proffer a sufficient reason to outweigh it. Expecting to cause 
inconvenience or irritation that would be excessive in light of the anticipated benefits of the cyber 
operation, which presumably would be trifling, would smack of mere maliciousness. The United States 
Department of Defense commendably appears to have accepted this approach as a matter of policy.80  
 
In  terms  of  balancing  humanitarian  considerations  with  a  State’s  conflict-related  interests,  the 
proposed policy adopts the  rule of proportionality’s  excessiveness test.  The Harvard Manual on the 
International Law Applicable to Air and Missile Warfare, prepared by a distinguished group of international 
law practitioners and scholars, took the reasonable position that excessiveness is characterized by a 
situation in which “there is a significant imbalance between the military advantage anticipated, on the 
one hand, and the expected collateral damage to civilians and civilian objects, on the other.” 81 This 
standard  accommodates  IHL’s  foundational  principle  of  military  necessity.  After  all,  it  would  be 
                                                 
80 DoD Manual, supra note 10, para. 16.5.2 (“For example, even if a cyber operation is not an ‘attack’ or does not cause 
any injury or damage that would need to be considered under the principle of proportionality in conducting attacks, that 
cyber operation still should not be conducted in a way that unnecessarily causes inconvenience to civilians or neutral 
persons.”). 
81 HARVARD MANUAL, supra note 78, at 92; N ILS MELZER, TARGETED KILLINGS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 344 and 360 
(2008). 
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impractical to apply a strict “51-49” balancing test with respect to two values – collateral damage and 
military  advantage  –  that  are  so  dissimilar,  especially  when  the  consequence  of  a  slight  perceived 
imbalance  in  favor  of  the  former  would  be  an  absolute  bar  to  striking  a  valid  military  objective. 
Sensitivity to this dynamic is also reflected in the Rome Statute’s application of the proportionality 
rule only when expected collateral damage is “clearly” excessive to the anticipated “overall” military 
advantage.82  
 
Given that the cyber operations encompassed by the policy include those directed against military 
objectives, albeit in situations that do not rise to the level of an attack, it would make no sense to lower 
the excessiveness bar. If a lower bar were to be suggested, States would harbour the same concern 
that animated the decision to adopt the excessiveness standard vis-à-vis proportionality. Indeed, the 
argument for a high threshold is actually stronger with respect to the policy because the harm, which 
is generally non-destructive and non-injurious, is of a less severe nature. 
 
The term “concrete benefit related to the conflict” in the proposed policy must be distinguished from 
“concrete and direct military advantage” found in the rule of proportionality. All of the adjectives 
reflect the military necessity component of the balancing that I contend should inform every military 
decision affecting the civilian population. However, as will be explained, the deletion of the word 
direct  is  meant  to  broaden  the  scope  of  the  policy  beyond  that  which  applies  in  the  case  of 
proportionality. 
 
According to the ICRC Commentary to the Additional Protocols, “the expression ‘concrete and direct’ 
was intended to show that the advantage concerned should be substantial and relatively close, and that 
advantages which are hardly perceptible and those which would only appear in the long term should 
be disregarded.”83 The term was also explained in the unofficial, although authoritative (in light of the 
authors’ participation in the Diplomatic Conference that produced the Additional Protocols) Bothe, 
Partsch and Solf commentary on the Protocol. It notes that “concrete” means “specific, not general; 
perceptible to the senses,” and equated it to the term “definite” in the definition of military objective, 
which  denotes  an  advantage  that  is  not  hypothetical  or  speculative.  84  By  contrast,  the  authors 
explained “direct” as meaning ‘‘‘without intervening condition of agency.’”85  
 
There is no logical basis for holding that the benefits to be considered when applying the proposed 
policy need not be concrete. To suggest that speculative benefits related to the conflict would ever 
suffice to justify actual negative expected consequences for the civilian population would effectively 
be to ignore humanitarian considerations altogether. However, the same logic does not apply to the 
qualifier “direct.” States would likely object to imposing the  proportionality  requirement of direct 
causal nexus between the operation and benefit that applies to cyber or other forms of attack. Consider 
the case of operations designed to undercut civilian support for involvement in the conflict. Such 
influence campaigns typically involve a chain of causation consisting of more than a single step. The 
information operation in question may be designed to shift civilian attitudes towards the government 
and to the conflict over time, perhaps by encouraging engagement by civil society or the media. As 
                                                 
82 Rome Statute, supra note 13, art. 8(2)(b)(iv). 
83. Additional Protocols Commentary,  supra note 51, para. 2209. 
84.  Michael  Bothe,  Karl  Josef  Partsch  &  Waldemar  A.  Solf,  NEW RULES  FOR VICTIMS  OF ARMED CONFLICTS: 
COMMENTARY ON THE TWO 1977 PROTOCOLS ADDITIONAL TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 1949, at 407 (2d ed. 
2013). See also United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, THE MANUAL OF THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT, para. 5.33.3 (2004). 
85 Bothe, Partsch & Solf, supra note 84, at 407. 
 16 
long as there is a causal nexus that is not so attenuated that it becomes speculative, it would, under 
the proposal, be appropriate for consideration in the balancing process. 
 
Precisely the same logic, albeit turned on its head, supports the limitation of negative effects for the 
civilian population to those that are concrete. To suggest a party to the conflict should have to forego 
an operation that would likely yield valid benefits related to the conflict on the basis of speculation as 
to possible negative effects on the civilian population would be to inappropriately skew the desired 
balance in the opposite direction. 
 
The  other  significant  difference  between  the  proposed  policy  and  the  rule  of  proportionality  is 
substitution of the term “military advantage” with the phrase “benefit related to the conflict.”  Military 
advantage is a concept that is narrowly construed in IHL.  For instance, the Harvard Manual provides: 
 
Military advantage refers only to advantage which is directly related to military operations and 
does not refer to other forms of advantage which may in some way relate to the conflict more 
generally. Military advantage does not refer to advantage which is solely political, 
psychological, economic, financial, social, or moral in nature. Thus, forcing a change in the 
negotiating position of the enemy only by affecting civilian morale does not qualify as military 
advantage.86 
 
The policy would not limit the advantage attained by cyber operations to that which is purely military. 
Taking  the  example  cited  above,  it  would  be  acceptable  to  consider  conducting  cyber  operations 
intended to alter the enemy’s negotiating position, even by affecting civilian morale. States already plan 
cyber operations not amounting to an attack, including those altering or deleting data, that have effects 
that are not strictly military. In light of the predictable resistance from them to imposing a standard 
that requires a military benefit, the proposal dispenses with the term military.  87 
 
It must be emphasized that advantage typically refers to an attacking party’s military gain at the tactical 
or operational levels of war, but not at the strategic, in the sense of political, level. 88 In other words, 
the advantage must have an impact on the battlefield or the campaign in question that is not overly 
attenuated.89 For example, the advantage of causing enemy military leaders to rethink involvement in 
the conflict, as in the case of attacks against their personal property or investments, would not qualify 
                                                 
86 Harvard Manual supra note 78, at 36. 
87 As noted in the U.K. declaration on ratification of Additional Protocol I, “the military advantage anticipated from an 
attack is intended to refer to the advantage anticipated from the attack as a whole and not only from isolated or particular 
parts of the attack.” UK Additional Protocol Ratification Statement, para. (i), available at 
http://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Notification.xsp?actionopenDocument&document 
Id0A9E03F0F2EE757CC1256402003FB6D2.   
88 “Tactical level of warfare — The level of warfare at which battles and engagements are planned and executed to achieve 
military objectives assigned to tactical units or task forces.” U.S. Department of Defense, DICTIONARY OF MILITARY AND 
ASSOCIATED TERMS 226 (current as of  March 2018); “Operational level of  warfare  — The level of  warfare at which 
campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted, and sustained to achieve strategic objectives within theaters or 
other operational areas.” Id. at 173; “Strategic level of warfare — The level of warfare at which a nation, often as a member 
of a group of nations, determines national or multinational (alliance or coalition) strategic security objectives and guidance, 
then develops and uses national resources to achieve those objectives.” Id. at 219. 
89   UK Manual, supra note 84, para. 5.33.5; Harvard Manual, supra note 78, at 36-37; Tallinn Manual 2.0, supra note 6, at 
442. See also Ian Henderson, THE CONTEMPORARY LAW OF TARGETING (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2009), at 199-202 
(providing a more detailed discussion of why military advantage may be measured at the operational as opposed to the 
tactical level, and why measuring military advantage at the strategic level is generally not appropriate).  
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those  targets  as  military  objectives  nor  justify  collateral  damage  to  them  when  engaging  in  the 
proportionality analysis.   
 
However, States do seek strategic level advantage that does not bear on battlefield operations and 
under IHL are permitted to conduct military operations falling short of an attack in order to attain it. 
Thus, to be palatable to States, the proposed policy permits concrete benefits at any level of war to be 
factored into the assessment of whether the cyber operation may be launched. By way of illustration, 
blocking the ability of the enemy to disseminate conflict-related propaganda to the population through 
denial of service operations against media facilities would qualify as a benefit to be weighed in the 
balance.   
 
Despite this widening of scope relative to the proportionality rule’s standard, the policy limits benefits 
to those regarding which a clear nexus to the conflict exists. Although doing so might spark allegations 
of being overly restrictive, the intent of the policy is to enhance protection against disruption of the 
civilian population during what is likely to already be a dreadful situation – armed conflict. Malicious 
or vindictive cyber operations directed at civilians or the civilian population should be prohibited. 
 
The  requirement  must  not  be  confused  with  application  of  the  principle  of  military  necessity. 
According to some interpretations of the principle, “only that degree and kind of force, not otherwise 
prohibited by the law of armed conflict, that is required in order to achieve the legitimate purpose of 
the conflict, namely the complete or partial submission of the enemy at the earliest possible moment 
with the minimum expenditure” is permitted. 90 Applying this principle would not suffice to address 
the problems at hand. 
 
First, as set forth, the principle of military necessity only applies to a use of force; the proposed policy 
addresses  cyber  operations  that  are  not  easily  described  as  such.  Second,  while  it  is  addressed  to 
necessity based on “military” considerations, the term “related to the armed conflict” in the policy is 
broader. Third, and most significantly, there is opposition to treating the principle of military necessity 
as  a  primary  rule  of  international  law  that  operates  independently  of  other  primary  rules  of 
international law. This issue was in part responsible for opposition to the ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance 
on the Notion of  Direct Participation, 91 and is viewed with suspicion by some in the field. 92 My own view 
is that military necessity is a foundational principle of international humanitarian law, but not a primary 
rule.93 Whatever the correct interpretation, the principle of military necessity cannot accomplish the 
ends sought through adoption of the proposed policy. 
 
                                                 
90 UK Manual, supra note 84, para. 2.2.  
91 Opposition to Chapter IX of the Interpretive Guidance, supra note 33, arose when some experts participating in the 
project objected to what they considered use of the principle as a primary rule of law. See, e.g., W. Hays Parks, Part IX of  
the ICRC “Direct Participation in Hostilities” Study: No Mandate, No Expertise, and Legally Incorrect, 42 N EW YORK UNIVERSITY 
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS 769 (2010), at 802-810.  But see the reply by Nils Melzer, then of the 
ICRC’s legal division, who led the project. Nils Melzer, Keeping the Balance between Military Necessity and Humanity: A Response 
to Four Critiques of  the ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of  Direct Participation in Hostilities, 42 N EW YORK UNIVERSITY 
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS 831 (2010), at pp. 892-912. 
92 Interestingly, see DoD Manual, supra note 10, para. 16.5.2. (operations not qualifying as attacks nevertheless “must not 
be directed against enemy civilians or civilian objects unless the operations are militarily necessary.”). This discussion has 
been criticized, and rightly so.  William H. Boothby and Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg, T HE LAW OF WAR: A DETAILED 
ASSESSMENT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE LAW OF WAR MANUAL (Cambridge U.P. 2018). 
93 Schmitt, Military Necessity, supra note 19. 
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Finally, like the rule of proportionality, the test proposed in the policy is applied ex ante, not post factum; 
the  policy  uses  of  the  terms  “anticipated”  and  “expected”  drawn  from  the  former.  Thus,  those 
applying the policy will be judged against the facts as they reasonably believed them to be at the time 
the cyber operation was planned, approved, and executed. 
 
 
IV. Concluding Reflections 
 
The  current  state  of  the  international  humanitarian  law  governing  cyber  operations  is  not  fully 
satisfactory. Lack of clarity as to which cyber operations qualify as an attack at best leaves civilians at 
risk when they otherwise should not be and at worst opens the door to States wishing to exploit the 
ambiguity  in  order  to  mount  highly  disruptive  cyber  operations  against  the  civilian  population. 
Moreover, some cyber operations that would clearly not qualify as an attack could nevertheless create 
chaos among the civilian population. 
 
The issue of whether data is an object complicates this situation. On the one hand, if it is, many cyber 
operations  presently  conducted  by  States  would  be  barred.  Laudable  though  their  intent  may  be, 
advocates of this view are naïve in believing the interpretation will prove acceptable to States that 
wield cyber capabilities.94 But on the other hand, failing to treat some civilian data as a civilian object 
that  benefits  from  IHL’s  protective  umbrella  undervalues  the  humanitarian  considerations  that 
underpin the prohibition on attacking civilian objects. In terms of finding an appropriate balance of 
humanitarian considerations and military necessity, arguments on both sides of the fence fall short. 
 
The proposed policies are designed to address these realities. Initially, States may react negatively to 
them. This is often the reaction when academics and nongovernmental organizations seek to limit 
their discretion on the battlefield; in many such cases, that reaction is justified. However, in these 
cases, States should bear the following in mind. 
 
First, in my discussion with cyber operators, it would appear that some elements of the policies already 
take the form of rules of engagement, other guidance or simply accepted practice. More importantly, 
Article 57(1) of Additional Protocol I requires parties to a conflict to take the possibility of negative 
consequences for the civilian population and/or civilian objects into consideration during military 
operations, including but not limited to attacks. I believe the requirement is reflective of customary 
IHL and groups of experts and military manuals confirm that this “constant care” provision is meant 
to impose an affirmative duty, albeit one that is general and poorly defined.95 All the proposed policies 
do is provide some guidance as to measures to be taken in response to that assessment. 
 
                                                 
94  Interesting  work  in  this  regard  is  being  done  by  Lieutenant  Colonel  Bart  van  den  Bosch  (Netherlands  Army)  in  a 
University of Amsterdam PhD (“Waging War Without Violence”) under the direction of Professor Terry Gill and Brigadier 
General Paul Duchiene. 
95 See U.K. Manual supra note 11, para. 5.32.1 (“So the commander will have to bear in mind the effect on the civilian 
population of what he is planning to do and take steps to reduce that effect as much as possible.”); Harvard Manual, supra 
note 10, at 142 (“‘Constant care’ means that there are no exceptions from the duty to seek to spare the civilian population, 
civilians and civilian objects.”); TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 6, at 477 (noting the “broad general duty to ‘respect’ the 
civilian population, that is to consider deleterious effects of military operations on civilians”). Further, the Tallinn Manual 
2.0 states, “the duty of constant care requires commanders and all others involved in the operations to be continuously 
sensitive to the effects of their activities on the civilian population and civilian objects, and to seek to avoid any unnecessary 
effects thereon.” Id. 
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In this regard, it might be suggested that the work of the policies is already accomplished through 
application of the Martens Clause because the situations highlighted are ones that should be subject 
to the “laws of humanity” and the “dictates of the public conscience.” Yet, States and experts disagree 
over the means by which the clause is to be implemented and whether it imposes specific binding 
rules of law on the parties to the conflict. Irrespective of where one stands on these issues, the Martens 
Clause is notable for its vagueness and its paucity of application in practice. This being so, the policies 
provide a degree of practical clarity and direction that can operate to provide actual protection to the 
civilian population. 
 
Second, prohibiting attacks against cyber infrastructure or data that would  interfere with essential 
civilian functions or services is consistent with the general premise that there are certain activities, 
functions  and  objects  that  deserve  special  protection  from  the  harmful  effects  of  warfare.  The 
proposal merely acknowledges that the existing universe thereof should expand in response to the 
unique and sometimes severe risks for the civilian population that are associated with cyber operations. 
Moreover, the policy leaves it to States to determine which functions and services qualify as essential 
and are accordingly deserving of special protection, at least as a matter of policy.  
 
Third,  perceptive  readers  will  have  noticed  that  the  second  policy  mandating  balancing  is  more 
restrictive with respect to operations not qualifying as attacks against military objectives than those 
that qualify as attacks. The rule of proportionality applicable  in cyber attacks only requires 
consideration of damage (including, presumably, loss of functionality), injury or death. By contrast, 
the proposed policy encompasses all negative effects on the civilian population. This might seem 
counterintuitive. 
 
Nevertheless, the result is compensated for by the fact that the policy is more permissive in terms of 
what the party conducting the cyber operation may consider when balancing against those negative 
effects. The rule of proportionality is limited to concrete and direct military advantage. By contrast, 
the policy allows consideration of benefits that are neither direct nor military in character, and those 
benefits may accrue at the strategic level of warfare. Thus, the proposed policy achieves a fair balance 
between humanitarian considerations and the interest of the State. States can find further solace in the 
policy’s  adoption  of  the  excessiveness  standard.  That  standard  affords  parties  to  the  conflict  a 
significant margin of appreciation when applying the policy. 
 
The proposals are not panaceas with respect non-destructive and non-injurious harm to the individual 
civilians or the civilian population from cyber operations. Much such harm would remain unaddressed, 
as in the case of application of the proportionality rule to cyber attacks, for that rule only applies to 
collateral damage, injury or death. Nevertheless, the time for States and international community to 
address humanitarian issues is always before they have manifested tragically on the battlefield. In this 
case, that time is now.  
 
 
 
